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SURVEY SECTION
Land Use and Planning. Sciacca v. Caruso, 769 A.2d 578 (R.I.
2001). The planning board for the town of Johnston conditionally
granted a landowner of two previously merged parcels of land the
ability to re-divide the parcels to their original, pre-merger dimen-
sions. Following this conditional grant, the landowner petitioned
the zoning board for a dimensional variance to facilitate building a
new home on one of the newly separated lots. The Rhode Island
Supreme court reversed the superior court's decision upholding the
zoning board's grant of the dimensional variance. In doing so, the
court held that the superior court misapplied the law in question
and that the variance was improperly granted because the land-
owner created the very hardship from which variance relief was
sought by subdividing her property.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Gloria Caruso (Caruso) acquired two adjacent residential lots
in Johnston, Rhode Island in the 1960s.1 These lots were then
known as Nos. 91 and 92, and at that time were independently
buildable, each respectively having the necessary road frontage
and overall square footage for a building permit to be issued.2
Shortly after obtaining the two parcels, Caruso constructed a sin-
gle-family dwelling on lot No. 91, which she retained as a personal
residence.3 Additionally, Caruso landscaped lot No. 92 and con-
structed a shed on the premises.4
Following Caruso's construction of her house and adjoining
shed, the town of Johnston amended its zoning ordinance. 5 In
1979, an amendment was passed "placing both lots [No. 91 and 921
in an 'R-20' residential zoning district that required a minimum
total area of 20,000 square feet and minimum road frontage of 120
feet to build a single-family dwelling on any given lot."6 The new
amendment also included a "merger provision," whereby contigu-
ous lots owned by the same entity that failed independently to
meet the new minimum frontage and footage requirements were to
1. Sciacca v. Caruso, 769 A.2d 578, 579 (R.I. 2001).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 579. For the text of the amended zoning ordinance see Johnston
Town Code § 26-16(a) & (b) (1995).
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be merged together into a single parcel.7 Further, the amended
ordinance contained explicit language forbidding the subdivision of
contiguous parcels with common ownership when such subdivision
would cause the new lot or lots to be below the minimum frontage
and footage requirements.8 Pursuant to the amended ordinance
provisions, Caruso's two lots were merged into a single parcel.9
In 1997, Caruso determined that she wanted to utilize the un-
developed land on lot No. 92 to build an additional three-bedroom
house.' 0 Through her builder, Caruso filed an application with the
Johnston planning board to have her merged property re-subdi-
vided into its two original pieces, parcels No. 91 and 92.11 Al-
though Caruso's neighbors never received notice of her application,
the planning board "conditionally granted Caruso's request and
approved a lot-line change, thereby subdividing the lots and restor-
ing them to their original dimensions."12
After obtaining this conditional approval, Caruso submitted
an application to the Johnston zoning board, requesting a dimen-
sional variance to build on the smaller of her two lots, No. 92.13
This lot measured 14,364 square feet and had only 100 feet of road
frontage, both of which were below the minimum dimensional re-
quirements set out in the 1979 ordinance.14 Caruso's neighbors
opposed her application, submitting the testimony of a qualified
real estate appraiser and consultant that the proposed variance
should not be granted because "Caruso would suffer no loss of the
beneficial use of her property if the board denied her request for a
dimensional variance."15 In addition, he suggested that any new
building built on the small lot No. 92 would unreasonably "'crowd'
the lot and lessen the value of the adjoining properties." 16 Caruso
did not present any evidence to counter this testimony or otherwise
demonstrate that she would have "no 'other reasonable alternative
7. Id. at 579, n.1 (quoting Johnston Town Code § 26-16(b) (1995)).
8. Id. at 579, n.1 (quoting Johnston Town Code § 26-16(b) (1995)).
9. Id. at 580.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 580.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 579.
15. Id. at 580.
16. Id. at 581.
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way to enjoy a legally permitted beneficial use of the subject
property.'"17
At its first hearing on October 30, 1997, the zoning board
unanimously denied Caruso's petition.' 8 However, approximately
one month later the zoning board reconsidered the application by
its own motion, and granted it on January 29, 1998, by a four-to-
one vote, without providing any record of the reasoning underlying
this decision. 19 The neighbors appealed the zoning board's deci-
sion to the superior court, where its grant of the application was
affirmed upon the judge's finding that Caruso "met the threshold
showing required for the granting of a dimensional variance ('more
than a mere inconvenience')." 20 In upholding the zoning board's
decision, the superior court judge held that the planning board's
previous decision to grant the conditional lot-line change rendered
the merger provisions of the Johnston zoning ordinance irrelevant
to review of the case. 21 The neighbors petitioned the Rhode Island
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, and that petition for review
was granted.22
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
In analyzing the case, the supreme court first noted that fol-
lowing its decision in Viti v. Zoning Board of Review of Provi-
dence,23 it was firmly established that a request for a "dimensional
variance" from dimensional or area restrictions regulating the ap-
propriate use of a particular piece of property required only a
showing by the applicant landowner of "'an adverse impact
amounting to more than a mere inconvenience.'"24 However, the
court notes that the General Assembly's decision to "comprehen-
17. Id. at 581 (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-24-31(61)(ii) (1994)).
18. Id.
19. Id. Although the decision was rendered in January, the written decision
in the matter was filed on March 5, 1998. Id. In this decision, the zoning board
provided "no reasons for its ruling, nor did its decision indicate why it had recon-
sidered its earlier denial of the requested variance." Id. at 581.
20. Id. at 581.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 166 A.2d 211, 214 (1960).
24. Sciacca, 769 A.2d at 582 (citing Gara Realty, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Review
of South Kingstown, 523 A.2d 855, 858 (R.I. 1987) (quoting DeStefano v. Zoning
Bd. of Review of Warwick, 405 A.2d 1167, 1170 (1979)); Viti, 166 A.2d at 214).
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sively amend Rhode Island's zoning laws in 1991"25 through the
enactment of General Laws § 45-24-41, created a "new, uniform,
and comprehensive state-wide zoning plan that revised previous
zoning laws in several important respects."26 One respect in which
this newly enacted zoning amendment affects previous zoning law
is through its redefinition of the term "more than a mere inconve-
nience" to mean, for purposes of obtaining a variance, "'that there
is no other reasonable alternative to enjoy a legally permitted ben-
eficial use of one's property.'"27 The court noted that this redefini-
tion by the General Assembly sounded the "death knell" of its
previous interpretation of the Viti case, making it more difficult for
a property owner to obtain a dimensional variance under the new
standard.28 In addition, the court noted that the 1991 amendment
passed by the General Assembly still retains the requirement that
a dimensional variance not be granted to "'the owner of a substan-
dard lot where such lot was created by the deliberate conduct of
the applicant.'"29
Applying these observations to the case at hand, the court con-
cluded that the superior court judge misapplied the standard an-
nounced in § 45-24-41(c), and that this misapplication constituted
reversible error. The supreme court held that the superior court
should have considered both whether Caruso had met her burden
proving "'no other reasonable alternative' to enjoying the use of lot
No. 92 except by granting the requested variance, [and also] the
self-created hardship rule of § 45-24-41(c)(2)." 30 Further, the court
held that the zoning board had improperly granted Caruso's vari-
ance because they had not taken into account her role in creating
25. See 1991 Pub. Laws ch. 307 § 1.
26. Sciacca, 769 A.2d at 582-83 (The supreme court notes that the General
Assembly "repealed what formerly had been sections 1 through 26 of chapter 24 of
title 45 of the General Laws," and that as a result, "those zoning provisions that
had authorized municipalities to relieve property owners of particular zoning re-
strictions by means of a variance, including deviations and dimensional variances,
were superceded by § 45-24-41.").
27. Id. at 583, n.6 (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-24-41(d)(2) (1994)).
28. Id. at 583; see also id. at 582, n. 6.
29. Id. at 583, (citing Rozes v. Smith, 388 A.2d 816, 820 (1978) (quoting 3 Rob-
ert M. Anderson, American Law of Zoning § 18.57 at 299-300 (2d ed. 1977))); see
also R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-24-41(c)(2) (1994) (requiring the applying landowner to
show that the present hardship is not the result of the applicant's prior action
before a variance can be granted).
30. Id. at 583.
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the hardship from which she was seeking relief.31 Caruso's prior
act of petitioning the planning board to have her merged lot re-
subdivided created a substandard lot requiring a dimensional vari-
ance before any building could occur on the premises.3 2 'Thus,
Caruso sought relief from dimensional zoning requirements that
became applicable to her substandard lot only because of her ear-
lier illegal subdivision of the property before the planning board."33
The supreme court held that the zoning board and the superior
court misapplied state law through both their respective acts of
granting and of upholding Caruso's requested dimensional
variance. 34
Finally, the court commented on the deficiency of the zoning
board's record regarding the basis for its decision in this case.
Here, the Johnston zoning board recorded only their decision on
the record, and failed to provide the later reviewing courts with a
specification of the evidence that the board was considering and
whether this evidence meets the requirements for variance relief
set forth in § 45-24-41(c) and (d).3r The supreme court cautioned
zoning boards to provide such a record in rendering their decisions,
and warned that zoning board decisions made due to "'special
knowledge"' by a particular board member of a local area or condi-
tion "'will not be upheld... unless the record reveals the underly-
ing facts or circumstances the board derived from its knowledge of
the area.'" 36
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a landowner seek-
ing a dimensional variance from a zoning board must prove, in ac-
cordance with the redefinition provided in § 45-24-41(d)(2), that no
reasonable alternative exists for the landowner to enjoy a legally
permitted beneficial use of his or her property before such a vari-
ance can legally be granted. The court emphasized that a dimen-
sional variance cannot be granted to an individual who has created
his or her own hardship through prior action, in accordance with
31. Id. at 584.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 584.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 585.
36. Id. at 585 (quoting DeStefano, 405 A.2d at 1171).
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§ 45-24-41(c)(2). Finally, the court warned zoning boards to clearly
note the evidence supporting their decisions on the record to assist
reviewing courts in interpreting their findings.
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